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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7041  
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7007  
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RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE  
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 0750  
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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

BERLIN/EYES ONLY FOR VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: FOR ACDA  
DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE ADELMAN; SHAPE/FOR GEN. ROGERS AND  
POLAD

USINF

E.O. 22356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, INF  
SUBJECT: NITZE/KVITSINSKIY CONVERSATION

1. THIS IS INF 371. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.
  2. BELOW ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN NITZE AND KVITSINSKIY ON JANUARY 28, 1983:
- KVITSINSKIY: IS THE VICE PRESIDENT GOING TO BRING US A  
-- MESSAGE?
- NITZE: NO. HIS MISSION IS PRIMARILY A FACT-FINDING  
-- MISSION.
- KVITSINSKIY: WHAT DO YOU RECOMMEND I TELL HIM?
- NITZE: THE TRUTH; THAT YOU HAVE TOLD US THAT YOU WON'T  
-- MOVE FIRST AND THAT YOU THINK THE US NEEDS AN  
-- AGREEMENT MORE THAN THE USSR DOES. I WILL TELL  
-- HIM THAT WE ARE TRYING TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS  
-- FORWARD AT ALL LEVELS BUT YOU ARE TRYING TO  
-- STALEMATE THE NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS WE MOVE FIRST  
-- ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE.
- KVITSINSKIY: I WILL FOLLOW YOUR ADVICE. I REALLY DON'T  
-- SEE ANY POINT IN DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS  
-- AND NUMBERS UNTIL WE ARE CLOSER ON THE  
-- MAIN ISSUES. IN MBFR WE HAVE BEEN BOGGED

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-- DOWN ON DATA FOR YEARS. THE QUESTIONS OF  
 -- NUMBERS END UP BEING A POLITICAL ISSUE.  
 -- NOT AN ISSUE OF FACT.

NITZE: ON THIS I DON'T AGREE AT ALL. WE ARE PREPARED  
 -- TO DISCUSS ALL THE PERTINENT FACTS AND TRY TO  
 -- NARROW MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

KVITSINSKIY: ARE YOU PREPARED TO DISCUSS ALL AIRCRAFT,  
 -- AND ON A WORLD-WIDE BASIS: WILL YOU DISCUSS  
 -- THE F-16, THE TORNADO, THE NEW FRENCH  
 -- MIRAGE?

NITZE: WE WON'T ACCEPT ARBITRARY CUT-OFF LINES SUCH AS  
 -- YOUR THOUSAND KILOMETER LIMITATION.

KVITSINSKIY: WITH RESPECT TO YOUR CONCERN REGARDING THE  
 -- LINE OF WITHDRAWAL AT 80 DEGREES, WE MAY BE  
 -- ABLE TO BE OF SOME HELP. WHAT DO YOU THINK  
 -- THE RANGE OF THE SS-20 IS?

NITZE: WE THINK IT IS MORE THAN 4400 KMS. MAYBE 5000 KMS.

KVITSINSKIY: ITS MAXIMUM FLIGHT DURING TESTS WAS A LITTLE  
 -- OVER 4000 KMS BUT WE HAVE ALWAYS FIRED IT  
 -- TOWARD THE EAST. TO THE WEST ITS RANGE  
 -- WOULD BE LESS.

NITZE: WE UNDERSTAND THAT AND ARE PREPARED TO MAKE  
 -- ALLOWANCE FOR THAT. BUT WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER  
 -- YOUR TESTS WERE AT FULL RANGE USING THE BEST  
 -- TRAJECTORY AND WHAT SAFETY MARGIN OF RESIDUAL  
 -- FUEL YOU USE. IS IT TWO PERCENT OR THREE PERCENT  
 -- OR IS IT FIVE OR TEN PERCENT?

KVITSINSKIY: PERHAPS WE CAN DISCUSS ALL THAT IN THE  
 -- MILITARY GROUP. WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOU  
 -- MIGHT HAVE SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE  
 -- THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY THAT SS-20S COULD  
 -- BE LOCATED NORTH OF NOVOSIBIRSK AND THUS  
 -- TAKE ADVANTAGE OF GREAT CIRCLE TRAJECTORIES.

NITZE: THEY COULD, OF COURSE, BE LOCATED IN CHOKOTKA  
 -- AND COVER ALL OF ALASKA AND SOME OF THE  
 -- CONTIGUOUS STATES. IF ONE TAKES YOUR CRITERION  
 -- THAT ANY WEAPON WHICH HAS THE RANGE TO STRIKE  
 -- THE OTHER'S TERRITORY, THEN RIFLES WOULD BE  
 -- STRATEGIC; THEY CAN STRIKE LITTLE DIOMEDE ISLAND

EXDIS

-- FROM GREAT DIOMEDE.

KVITSINSKIY: BUT SS-20S COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE LOCATED  
 -- IN CHOKOTKA; THE WEATHER IS TOO BAD; THEY  
 -- COULDN'T BE MAINTAINED.

NITZE: YOU MAINTAIN SUBMARINES AT PETROPAVLOSK; WOULDN'T  
 -- SS-20S AT ANADYR BE EASIER TO MAINTAIN?

THE SUBJECT THEN TURNED TO THE "WALK IN THE WOODS."

KVITSINSKIY: YOU REMEMBER THAT I TOLD YOU I WOULD HAVE  
 -- SOMEONE CALL YOU FROM OUR EMBASSY IN  
 -- WASHINGTON IF I FOUND OUR SIDE WERE  
 -- INTERESTED. LATER CLYNE TALKED TO ME TO  
 -- TELL ME THAT HE KNEW SOKOLOV AND KAPALOV  
 -- WHO WOULD KNOW WHERE TO FIND HIM AT ALL  
 -- TIMES. I ASKED YOU NOT TO TELL ANYONE IN  
 -- WASHINGTON ABOUT THE PACKAGE UNTIL YOU

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HEARD FROM ME.

ZE: YES. I DO REMEMBER THAT. BUT YOU WILL REMEMBER I MADE NO REPLY TO YOUR QUESTION: YOU HAD CONSULTED WITH GROMYKO; I WAS BOUND TO INFORM MY SUPERIORS IN WASHINGTON. THEIR ORIGINAL REACTION WAS FAVORABLE; LATER DOUBTS AND OBJECTIONS AROSE, PARTICULARLY OVER THE LACK OF FREEDOM TO CHOOSE BETWEEN CRUISE AND BALLISTIC MISSILES AND OVER THE HIGH CEILING IN THE FAR EAST WHICH YOU HAD INSISTED ON AND WHICH HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE PACKAGE ON YOUR AGREEMENT THAT THE RESULTING PACKAGE HAD BEEN JOINTLY DEVELOPED. WHEN I DIDN'T HEAR FROM YOU I WAS SURE YOU HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN IN MOSCOW AND SO INFORMED MY SUPERIORS.

ITSINSKIY: WHEN I GOT TO MOSCOW I FOUND NO INTEREST ON ANYONE'S PART AND THOUGHT YOU WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WAS THE CASE BECAUSE I HAD NOT GOTTEN A MESSAGE TO YOU. IN PARTICULAR, DOBRYNIN SENT WORD THAT THERE WAS NO INTEREST IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IN A "WELL PREPARED SUMMIT."

ITZE: I REGRET THAT; IT REMAINS MY BELIEF THAT HAD MOSCOW BEEN INTERESTED IN OUR JOINT PACKAGE THAT THAT COULD HAVE LED TO A CHANGE IN THE VIEW IN WASHINGTON THAT MOSCOW WAS DETERMINED TO RESIST ANY REASONABLE COMPROMISE AND THAT, THEREFORE, A SUMMIT WAS PREMATURE.

KVITSINSKIY: IT WAS MY HOPE THAT MY SUPERIORS WOULD AT LEAST ACCEPT THE PACKAGE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION; THAT THEY REFUSED TO DO.

NITZE: IT IS MY RECOLLECTION THAT YOU TOLD ME THAT THE ONE HOPE YOU HAD WAS THAT GROMYKO WOULD SEE SUFFICIENT INTEREST IN THE PACKAGE TO REFER IT TO BREZHNEV AND THAT IF HE WERE FAVORABLY INCLINED, THE OTHERS WOULD TRY TO BEND THEIR JUDGMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF BREZHNEV'S INDICATED PREFERENCE. (KVITSINSKIY CONCURRED BUT DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER GROMYKO HAD RAISED IT WITH BREZHNEV OR NOT. I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD NOT DONE SO.)

IT IS SAID IN WASHINGTON THAT YOUR EMBASSY IS SPREADING THE STORY THAT IT WAS INFORMED THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH THE PACKAGE BEFORE YOU HAD A CHANCE TO TELL ME OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING IT. IS THAT TRUE?

KVITSINSKIY: I HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THAT.

NITZE: NEXT WEEK I WILL BE TABLING A REVISED ARTICLE III OF OUR DRAFT TREATY TEXT.

NITZE: I PRESUME IT WILL LINK THE AIRCRAFT AND THE MISSILE CEILINGS UNDER THE 300 CEILING FROM WHICH BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS ARE TO BE SUBTRACTED ON THE US SIDE.

KVITSINSKIY: YOU WILL SEE. NITZE

END OF MESSAGE

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Had it is

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